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ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) on both earnings and balance sheet conservatism in Malaysia. Earnings 
conservatism has been used extensively in common-law countries such as the United States 
(US) and the United Kingdom (UK), which are known to have good financial reporting 
quality. In contrast balance sheet conservatism is more evident in code-law countries such 
as Japan and France, where accounting practice is highly influenced by the institutional 
culture similar to Malaysia such as political connection and family-firms. Since Malaysia 
uses international accounting standards adopted from common-law countries, we 
hypothesise that earnings conservatism will increase whereas balance sheet conservatism 
will decrease after the incorporation of IFRS in the financial reporting environment. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, we find that earnings conservatism and balance sheet 
conservatism increase and decrease respectively after Malaysia's convergence to IFRS. 
The results indicate that Malaysia has successfully adopted IFRS from common-law 
countries as earning conservatism increase after IFRS convergence. 
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INTRODUCTION
The issue of financial reporting quality has become more prominent due to recent 
corporate failures that occurred in developed countries, such as the United States 
of America, where rules and regulations are more stringent and rigid compared to 
other countries. The collapse of Enron and WorldCom have drawn the attention 
of regulators, practitioners, auditors and researchers, both in developed and 
developing countries, to the issue of financial reporting transparency. These cases 
have shattered the whole nation, particularly the companies' shareholders, as the 
financial reporting of the companies were 'decorated' with promising profits, lower 
debts and high revenues. In financial reporting, the issue of corporate transparency 
is more important as information that is accurate and relevant is needed by investors 
in their investment decision making and at the same time to ensure the security of 
their investments. Regulators are also demanding corporate transparency in order 
to exert more control on company operations and the behaviour of managers. 
Levitt (1998) defines quality as financial reporting transparency that 
signifies the basis of any business.1 He further states that success of capital markets 
is explicitly dependent on the accounting and disclosure system where high-quality 
accounting standards will produce financial statements that report events in real-
time. High-quality financial reporting ensures no added reserves and deferral of 
losses, and actual volatility is not smoothed away to portray a false representation 
of steady and consistent growth. Following the definition of quality as proposed by 
Levitt (1998), conservatism is regarded as the best measure for financial reporting 
transparency as this concept requires a higher level of verification in distinguishing 
between the good and the bad news. In this concept bad news is recognised earlier 
than good news and therefore earnings reflect bad news more quickly than good 
news. This means bad news is identified sooner than good news, thus, earnings 
reflects bad news faster than good ones.  Francis, Lafond, Olsson, and Schipper 
(2004) and Vichitsarawong, Eng and Meek (2010) use conservatism as a measure 
of financial reporting transparency since conservatism is regarded as a desirable 
attribute of accounting earnings that can be used in order to avoid unexpected 
economic downturn and corporate failure.
There are two types of conservatism: Earnings and balance sheet 
conservatism. Earnings conservatism is defined as the asymmetric response of 
earnings to economic gains and losses as such losses are recognised immediately in 
the current period, whereas profit will be reflected in the financial statement gradually 
over a number of years (Basu, 1997). Meanwhile, balance sheet conservatism is 
defined as the understatement of book values of net assets and overstatement of 
liabilities in the balance sheet with respect to market value of the firm (Feltham 
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& Ohlson, 1995). Both types of conservatisms lead to understatement of assets or 
profit and overstatement of liabilities or losses. However, what makes these two 
differ is the time of recognition as earnings conservatism is applied when there is 
news or indication from the stock prices whereas balance sheet conservatism is 
persistently applied in the balance sheet when it is compared to market value of the 
firm without any basis or indication. 
Due to the basis of recognition, earnings conservatism has been extensively 
used as a proxy for financial reporting quality compared to balance sheet 
conservatism and this type of conservatism has been tested on various applications 
such as litigation, contracting, corporate governance and other regulations. Most 
of the results provided by the previous studies (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Ball, 
Robin, & Shuang Wu, 2003; Basu, 1997; Bushman & Piotroski, 2006) support 
that earnings conservatism play an important role in alleviating agency problems 
and limit the losses from poor investment decisions. In contrast, balance sheet 
conservatism has been criticised as it provides understatement of book value 
without any basis or indication and hence facilitates the creation of "cookie-jar 
reserves" which may lead to earnings management2.
Investigating the effects of regulation such as IFRS on both types 
of conservatism is interesting as earnings conservatism is more apparent in 
common-law countries such as U.K which are known as having high financial 
reporting quality whereas balance sheet conservatism is more evident in code-law 
countries such as Germany and Japan where the main sources of financing are 
from a system of relationship-oriented capital, ownership structure which is more 
concentrated, less shareholder activism and a taxation policy that relies more on 
the lower value of assets (Black & White, 2003; Gassen, Fuelbier, & Sellhorn, 
2006; Joos & Lang, 1994; Lara & Mora, 2004). Lara and Mora (2004) argue that 
in the so-called common-law-based countries such as UK, the degree of balance 
sheet conservatism will be less pronounced than in the so-called code-law-based 
countries. Higher financial reporting quality in common law country is recognised 
as timely loss recognition as compared to code law countries (Ball et al., 2003). The 
loss recognition is considered as more important as the nature of companies tend 
to disclose good news as compared to bad news. Malaysia is one of the countries 
that decided to adopt IFRS by the year 2012. Despite the adoption, Malaysia 
provides a unique institutional setting. Principally, Malaysia uses International 
Accounting Standards (IAS), adopted by common-law countries such as the US 
and UK which have been known as having high quality of financial reporting 
(Ball et al., 2003). Nevertheless, primarily, accounting practices in Malaysia are 
highly influenced by its institutional culture similar to the code-law countries' 
such as political connection and family firms (Ball et al., 2000, Muniandy & Ali, 
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2012). The CLSA (Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia) Asia Pacific Markets report 
on the overall of Malaysia's performance in Corporate Governance Watch 2007 
reported that there is little confidence in the Malaysian market that independent 
directors are genuinely independent. Although public enforcement efforts have 
improved, the report blames the regulators for not having a reputation for treating 
companies and individuals equally. The CLSA committees make consensus that 
it is politics that hampers the ability of regulators to do their job properly (CLSA 
Asia Pacific Markets, 2007). The CLSA report in 2010 once again highlighted this 
issue as they pointed out that the main area of weaknesses in Malaysian corporate 
governance is on accountability and the number of independent audit committees. 
Their report highlight that Malaysia's financial reporting quality is significantly 
affected by culture (CLSA Asia Pacific Markets, 2010) as Malaysia's score for 
corporate governance culture dropped 1% from 33% in 2007 to 32% in 2010.3 
When comparing the governance score between political and regulatory and CG 
culture of 11 capital markets in Asia, the gap between these two scores is greatest 
in Malaysia which shows that CG culture still poses a threat to the corporate 
governance practices here even though there is improvement in the enforcement 
and regulatory system.
Due to unique institutional setting of Malaysia, investigating the effects of 
regulation such as IFRS on both types of conservatism is appealing. In addition, 
evidence on the impact of IFRS in Malaysia is rather limited. Wan Ismail, 
Kamarudin, Van Zijl and Dunstan (2013) provide initial evidence on the effects 
of IFRS on earnings quality in Malaysia. They found that, based on a proxy for 
earnings management, IFRS adoption increases the earnings quality in Malaysia. 
We opted for a similar approach to Wan Ismail et al. (2013). However, instead of 
examining the effects on accruals quality, we investigate the effects of IFRS on 
both earnings and balance sheet conservatism. In addition to extending an outlook 
on earnings quality in Malaysia, our choice of measures of conservatism will 
provide a support on the role of institutional settings in Malaysia. 
We offer the following motivations. First, to our humble knowledge, we 
initiate the first investigation on balance sheet conservatism in Malaysia. We view 
balance sheet conservatism as a complimentary tool on earnings conservatism 
and as proxies for earnings quality. Evidence on conservatism (either earnings or 
balance sheet) is limited in Malaysia. Mohamed Yunos, Ismail and Smith (2012) 
provide some evidence on the relationship of various ethnic groups and earnings 
conservatism and found mixed evidence. The use of a single type of conservatism 
(i.e. earnings conservatism) may not justify the insignificant findings between 
ethnicity and conservatism in their study. Therefore, an investigation on the effect 
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of IFRS on different types of conservatism may provide a different picture on 
Malaysia's institutional setting and its relationship with earnings quality.
We analyse earnings and balance sheet conservatism before and after 
IFRS. For earnings conservatism we used the model by Basu (1997) whereas for 
balance sheet conservatism we opted the model by Garcia-Lara and Mora (2004). 
This study is motivated by Malaysia's convergence to IFRS in 2006. Malaysia has 
announced its full convergence to IFRS on 1 August 2008 by 2012 but the effects 
of IFRS convergence with local standards is still largely unexplored. 
This study differs from other studies on conservatism and IFRS in several 
ways. First, this study is conducted specifically on Malaysia's institutional settings 
which could provide better and compelling evidence. Recent studies conducted 
utilised multiple countries by comparing the effect of IFRS adoption in code and 
common law countries (Callao, García, Jarne, & Gadea, 2010; Lara, Torres, & 
Viera, 2008) or in developing countries which have different legal systems and 
culture from emerging countries like Malaysia (Callao, Jarne, & Laínez, 2007; 
Karampinis & Hevas, 2011; Piot, Janin, & Dumontier, 2011). Second, this study 
investigates the effects of IFRS convergence on both types of conservatism; 
earnings and balance sheet conservatism. The investigation of both types of 
conservatism will help us to understand the uniqueness of Malaysia's institutional 
setting and its relation to financial reporting quality. 
Our results suggest that earnings conservatism is enhanced after IFRS. 
We also find that balance sheet conservatism is lower after the convergence. 
Therefore we provide strong evidence that IFRS is one of the main determinants 
of conservatism supporting the argument by Watts (2003a, 2003b).  
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
IFRS Adoption in Malaysia 
Before IFRS was issued by International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
the standards used were International Accounting Standards (IAS) issued by 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) from 1973 to 2001. 
After 2001, IASB published IFRS and, therefore, any standard in IAS that are 
contradictory with IFRS, will definitely be superseded by IFRS and IAS are 
usually disregarded.
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Malaysia's early adoption of a few IAS begins since 1978 until 1997. 
During this period, Malaysia Accounting Standards Board (MASB) standards are 
already in line with standards issued by IASB. However, the IASB standards are 
modified to suit the local environment, thus becoming national standards. The 
issuances made by the Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountant 
(MACPA) together with the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) were not 
enforceable on companies.  In 1997, Parliamentary Act established MASB and 
confers MASB standards as a legal standing for all firms. The standards issued 
by MASB became enforceable by virtue of Companies Act 1965 as well as other 
relevant acts for specialised industries like insurance. 
In 2005, as support for the IFRS issued by IASB, MASB rename the MASB 
standards to Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) meant to make it in line with 
standards issued by IASB except for some minor modifications. In January 2006, all 
Malaysian firms are required to converge the local reporting standards with IFRS by 
preparing financial statements according to IFRS. Since this year, Malaysian IFRS 
standards have been identical to the respective IFRS and IAS. The difference lies in 
the standards that Malaysia has not adopted. With the convergence, modifications 
of the standards are made if necessary.  Instead of adopting the whole standards as 
a required standard to prepare financial statements, Malaysia introduced two-tier 
financial reporting framework whereby the IFRS framework is made mandatory 
for non-private entities while the private entities can continue using the old MASB 
standards known as PERS (Private Entity Reporting Standards) framework. Figure 
1 shows the milestones for Malaysia's convergence to IFRS.
Harmonisation Period
1997–2005
Convergence Period
With effect from 2006
Figure 1. Milestones for Malaysia's convergence to IFRS
IFRS still provide various mechanisms which indirectly ensure the 
application of conditional conservatism. For example, recognition of probable 
liabilities and non-recognition of contingent asset in IAS 37, lower cost or net 
realisable value for inventories (IAS 2) and impairment of asset in IAS 36. 
Comparing IFRS with the local GAAP, IFRS introduced more stringent and 
systematic impairment testing rather than amortisation based on the judgement. 
The differences of financial reporting standards in the IAS and IFRS that would 
lead to more conservatism using IFRS are shown in Appendix.
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Malaysia's Political Economy and Ownership Structure
Malaysia's political economy is highly influenced by family ownership and 
political connection (Claessens & Fan, 2002; Jaggi, Leung, & Gul, 2009). This 
type of political economy has enabled corporate entities in Malaysia to seek capital 
fund from "insiders" rather than from capital market. Faccio (2007) reports that 
connected firms enjoy easier access to debt financing from state-controlled banks, 
even though their situations do not justify additional credit. Johnson and Mitton 
(2003) found that politically connected public firms in Malaysia had significantly 
better returns even under the situation of capital control. Therefore, there is less 
demand of informative financial statements by the public. In addition, being 
politically connected facilitates firms to get private information and, hence, any 
information asymmetry between shareholders and managers are settled through 
"insider communication" rather than through "public disclosure". While compliance 
with approved accounting standards is mandatory, companies may send voluntary 
signals about their activities and performance using private information (Mohd 
Saleh, Che Abdul Rahman, & Hassan, 2009). This situation creates less incentive 
for the preparers of financial statement to enhance disclosure by adopting IAS. 
The influence and dominance of family presence and ownership in 
Malaysia has been well documented (Claessens & Fan, 2002; Jaggi et al., 2009). 
According to statistics, which has been presented by South China Morning Post 
(SCMP), Malaysia has the second highest percentage of family ownership of listed 
companies in the region after Indonesia (Jaggi et al., 2009). Claessens, Djankov 
and Lang (2000) found that the presence of family dominance has enabled them to 
control firms and this represents a large percentage of stock market capitalisation 
in nine East Asian countries including Malaysia. This situation has led to Type II 
agency problem, which is the conflict between majority and minority shareholders 
in which minority shareholders have less power to voice out their dissatisfaction 
with a firm's poor governance.
Institutional background of Malaysia, which emphasises the Bumiputras 
privileges, has also leaved it hostile to ethnic Chinese Malaysians.4 In order to 
establish their position among the Malays, Chinese businesses have responded 
in several ways. Chinese Malaysians with mobile capital investments have move 
away from active politics, engaging in high-risk, short-term speculative ventures 
and diversifying overseas to strengthen the concession in Malaysia's political 
economy. Malaysia's richest man, Robert Kuok Hock Nien, for example, has 
diversified his interests across Asia without any political favouritism. Some of them, 
for example Vincent Tan Chee Yioun from property and gambling conglomerate 
Berjaya Group, seeks direct ties with a Malay political party through its official 
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Chinese party in the UMNO coalition, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) 
(Pepinsky, 2008).5
Malaysia's convergence to IFRS is seen as a step forward to produce 
accounting earnings characteristics closer to common-law countries such as the 
U.K. It is seen as good effort by the regulators to enhance transparency and give 
awareness to public listed companies and stakeholders on the importance of faithful 
and truthful financial statements. Dato' Zainal Abidin Putih, the chairman of MASB, 
in one of his speech on Malaysia's full convergence to IFRS in 2012, commented 
that since Malaysia has included the provisions of the international standards 
into its local accounting standards beginning 1978 and these standards have also 
been used by more than a hundred countries worldwide, it is believed that IFRS 
will facilitate comparability and increase transparency (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2009) and thus is expected to prevail over the code law countries' characteristics. 
EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS
The concept of conservatism historically has been one of the most influential 
accounting principles (Sterling, 1967) and has dominated other accounting 
principles such as historical cost and realisation concept for centuries (Basu, 
1997). Various definitions of conservatism have been proposed by the accounting 
authority bodies such as IASB and FASB and these definitions have also led to 
debate on the applications of conservatism as a proxy for financial reporting quality.
In the Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No. 2 (SSAP2): 
"Disclosure of Accounting Policies" conservatism is described as understatement 
of assets or profits and overstatement of liabilities or losses (Accounting Standards 
Board, 1971). Nevertheless, the general authoritative definition to some extent 
does not properly discuss on what is the appropriate level of conservatism and 
how it is determined (Hellman, 2008). Hellman (2008) illustrates that previous 
researchers (such as Schmalenbach [1959] and Sillen and Vasthagen [1962]) are 
also unclear on how far conservatism should be applied. To some extent, they 
argue that conservatism can play its role to protect the stakeholders, whereas in 
other extent conservatism may lead to manipulation and distortion of information.
Earnings Conservatism
Basu (1997) proposes an operational definition of conservatism, which provides 
a clearer base of assets or profits and liabilities or losses valuation, compared to 
the theoretical definition provided by the authority bodies. Basu (1997) defines 
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conservatism as reflecting bad news more quickly than good news. He states that 
conservatism is applied when there is news by requiring higher degree of verification 
for recognising good news compared to bad news. Chi, Liu and Wang (2009) state 
that there are two important reporting features of earnings conservatism, which 
are asymmetric timeliness in recognition of gains versus losses and, a systematic 
understatement of net assets. The term "systematic" provides an explanation that 
the earnings conservatism based on valuation needs a formal indication on when 
to recognise and how much to recognise. 
Balance Sheet Conservatism
Balance sheet conservatism is consistent with unconditional or ex-ante conservatism 
as this type of conservatism is not dependent on the news and it is recognised 
before or without receiving any news (Pae, Thornton, & Welker, 2005). Givoly and 
Hayn (2000) use market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the degree of balance sheet 
conservatism. This measurement is based on the balance-sheet-oriented definition 
of conservative accounting suggested by the theoretical framework developed 
by Feltham and Ohlson (1995). Feltham and Ohlson (1995) define balance sheet 
conservatism as "the existence of a persistent understatement of the book value 
figure with respect to market's valuation of the firm". The market-to-book ratio, 
that is greater than one, indicates conservative accounting and, other things being 
equal, an increase in the ratio over time suggests an increase in the degree of 
reporting balance sheet conservatism.
Conservatism and IFRS
Most of prior studies have documented positive effects of IFRS. There are evidence 
that IFRS can reduce analysts' absolute forecast error (Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001), 
have more persistent and more conditionally conservative earnings (Gassen et al., 
2006), can cause an increase in market liquidity (Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 
2008), and a decrease in earnings management (Barth, Landsman, & Lang, 2008; 
Zéghal, Chtourou, & Sellami, 2011) and an increase in stock price informativeness 
(Beuselinck, Joos, Khurana, & Meulen, 2009). There are also evidences that IFRS 
can enhance conservatism. Lara et al. (2008) show in their results that earnings 
conservatism is more pronounced in common-law-based developed economies 
and the voluntary use of IASB standards in Europe (prior to 2005) has significantly 
increased the measures of earnings conservatism in adopting firms. 
Previous studies (e.g. Barth et al., 2008; Daske et al., 2008) offer three 
arguments on why the adoption of IFRS can yield significant capital market 
benefits. Firstly, its reporting promotes transparency and this improves the quality 
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of financial reporting since the standards are more capital-market-oriented and 
more comprehensive than local GAAP, particularly when involving disclosures. 
Secondly, this practice also lowers the amount of reporting discretion in relation 
to local GAAPs. Thirdly, IFRS reporting has been found to improve financial 
statement comparisons across firms. Additionally, according to Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2005), the tightening accounting standards can reduce the level of 
earnings management and hence improve financial reporting quality.
IFRS emphasises on fair value principle which involves a process of asset 
or liability recognition, initial measurement at fair value, re-measurement (again, 
largely, at fair value) and de-recognition. Based on this principle, losses will be 
valued at market value, thus, increases conservatism among managers.6 Since the 
natural behaviour of humans is to be more inclined to disclose good news rather 
than bad news, recognition of losses is considered as more important in increasing 
transparency among managers. 
Hellman (2008) proposes that the consistent understatement of assets 
characterised by the balance sheet approach is overcame in the IFRS as the new 
standards temporarily lower down the value of assets and will be reversed later 
due to change in accounting estimates. Hellman (2008) stresses that conservatism 
applied in IFRS can reduce the creation of hidden (off-balance) reserves or 
excessive provisions created by consistent undervaluation of asset in balance sheet 
conservatism.  
It is believed that rules and regulations such as IFRS is one of the 
determinants of earnings conservatism that can induce firms to protect their 
shareholders and debt holders. Malaysia's convergence of local standards to 
IFRS is seen as a step forward by the regulators to enhance transparency and put 
awareness on public listed companies and the stakeholders on the importance of 
faithful and truthful of financial statements. Therefore, we hypothesise that:
H1: Earnings conservatism increases after IFRS convergence
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) state that there are three reasons earnings 
conservatism is preferable than balance sheet conservatism. First, the timely loss 
recognition of earnings conservatism provided by Basu's (1997) model provides 
an important role of conservatism in governance. Secondly, by understating the 
book value of assets, balance sheet conservatism reduces the opportunities of firms 
to account value in a conditionally conservative fashion. For example, if firms 
take into account balance sheet conservatism by immediate expensing assets, it 
eliminates their opportunity to impair the asset when the market value provides 
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evidence that the value has been reduced. Thirdly, balance sheet conservatism can 
reduce contracting efficiency as it introduces randomness in decisions based on 
financial information.
Due to these reasons, this type of conservatism has been subjected 
to criticisms and is associated with lower financial reporting quality. Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) argue that conservatism "seems at best neutral if the 
bias of understatement is known". If the bias is unknown, then it may lead to 
inefficiency. Therefore, even though both of the definition of balance sheet and 
earnings conservatism is understood as lead to bias (higher verification of revenue 
compared to losses), at least the bias in earnings conservatism is known. Due to 
these arguments, we hypothesise that: 
H2: Balance sheet conservatism decreases after IFRS convergence
Empirical research have been done by researchers (e.g. Pae et al., 2005; 
Beaver & Ryan, 2005; García-Lara & Mora, 2004; Givoly, Hayn, & Natarajan, 
2007; Roychowdhury & Watts, 2006; Pope & Walker, 2003) to test the relationship 
between earnings and balance sheet conservatism and they support that there is a 
negative relationship between earnings and balance sheet conservatism as such 
balance sheet conservatism pre-empt earnings conservatism. 
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS
Sample Selection and Data Collection
Our initial sample consists of 857 firms from Bursa Malaysia listed firms over 
the period 2004-2009. Financial institutions, insurance and real estate companies 
are excluded due to different regulatory framework. PN4 companies, companies 
that change their financial year end and companies with missing data are also 
excluded from the sample yielding a final sample of 3274 observations for 
earnings conservatism and 4018 observations for balance sheet conservatism. 
The differences between the sample of earnings and balance sheet conservatism 
is mainly attributable to the need of one year observation of price adjusted on 
pre-sample period to calculate return and also to the fact that excludes all missing 
values for the price adjusted. The sample is divided into two periods which are 
pre-IRS (2004 and 2005) and post-IFRS (2006 till 2009). The year selection is 
based on effective date for preparing financial statements based on IFRS for all 
Malaysian firms which is on 1 January 2006. 
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Table 1
Data distribution of sample firms
Panel A: Earnings Conservatism
Description Number of observations
Initial sample 5142
(-) Financial institutions, insurance and real estate companies (294)
(-) PN4 companies, companies that change financial year end 
and companies with missing data
(1501)
(-) Outliers (73)
Final sample 3274
Panel B: Balance Sheet Conservatism
Description Number of observations
Initial sample 5142
(-) Financial institutions, insurance and real estate companies (294)
(-) PN4 companies, companies that change financial year end 
and companies with missing data
(284)
(-) Outliers (546)
Final sample 4018
Table 2
Description of variables
Panel A: Earnings Conservatism
Variables Symbol Definition
Earnings/price (DV) N Net income before extraordinary items per share of firm i, 
deflated by beginning of period share price
Returns R Fiscal year continuously compounded return (log)
Negative returns DR Dummy variable that takes the value of one if return is 
negative, and zero otherwise
Panel B: Balance Sheet Conservatism
Variables Symbol Definition
Share price P Share price at the balance sheet date
Net income NI Earnings per share
Book value BV Period-end book value of shareholders' equity per share (log)
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Data are extracted from Compustat Global. The minimum data required 
for each firm-year observation are the current year's earnings, the previous fiscal 
year-end stock price, book value of assets and equity and returns data (Basu, 1997). 
Following Vichitsarawong et al. (2010) and Ball et al. (2003), accounting variables 
are deflated by the beginning of period price to control for heteroscedasticity. In 
addition, serial correlation of period SUR is reported for regressions to correct for 
heteroscedasticity and general correlation of observations within a cross-section. 
The 1st and 100th percentiles of each variable are excluded to reduce the effect of 
outliers. Finally, each firm-year observation with a missing value for any of the 
variables is excluded. Table 2 shows the definition of variables used in this study.
Model Specification
Earnings conservatism was tested using Basu's (1997) model specification. This 
model has been tested in Malaysia by Ball et al. (2003) and Vichitsarawong (2007). 
Basu (1997) uses reverse regression of annual earnings on contemporaneous 
returns to investigate the relationship between economic income, as measured by 
stock returns, and accounting income. The model is shown as follows:
Nit = β0 + β1DRit + β2Rit + β3RitxDRit + εit (1)
Where Nit is net income before extraordinary items per share of firm 
i, deflated by beginning of period share price; Rit fiscal year continuously 
compounded return; and DRit is dummy variable, equalling one if Rit is negative, 
and zero otherwise. The earnings variable Nit is calculated, as Xit /NitPit–1 where Xit 
is net income before extraordinary items for firms i, Nit is the adjusted number of 
shares and Pit–1 is the share price.
In this model, stock returns are the independent variable, while earnings are 
the dependent variable. The coefficient on stock returns β2 measures the sensitivity 
of accounting income to positive stock returns (a proxy for economic gains). The 
coefficient β3 is the main measurement for earnings conservatism which measures 
the incremental sensitivity of accounting income to the incorporation of bad news 
as measured by negative stock returns (a proxy for economic losses). The total 
sensitivity of accounting income to negative stock returns is measured by (β2 + β3).
Previously, Givoly and Hayn (2000) used market-to-book ratio to examine 
the existence of balance sheet conservatism. Nevertheless, this measurement 
has been criticized as market-to-book ratio can be driven by many other factors 
(growth options, the possibility of monopoly rents and/or synergies, inflation, 
etc.). Consequently, Lara et al. (2004) investigate the effects of balance sheet 
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conservatism using a valuation framework provided by Ohlson (1995), which 
expresses price as a function of both earnings and book value of equity. 
Ohlson model (1995) has been widely used in value-relevance study. 
Despite of that, the model has also been used to capture different properties of 
accounting such as conservatism. The model illustrates the effect of conservative 
accounting on the relation between equity value, accounting book value and future 
earnings (Lundholm, 2010). 
This model has been utilised by Garcia-Lara et al. (2004) who investigates 
the effects of balance sheet conservatism using a valuation framework provided by 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995), which expresses price as a function of both earnings 
and book value of equity:
Pit = α + β1NIit + β2BVit + εit (2)
Where Pit is the share price at the balance sheet date, NIit is the earnings after 
extraordinary items per share, BVit is the period-end book value of shareholders' 
equity per share. In the particular model above, the intercept of the undeflated 
regression of price on earnings and book value is significantly larger, while the 
book value coefficient is significantly positive if the balance sheet conservatism 
exists and practiced in Malaysia. The coefficient B2 is the main measurement for 
balance sheet conservatism. 
In order to test the relationship between the adoption of IFRS and 
conservatism, both of the conservatism models are employed using dummy year 
variable for period pre (year 2004 and 2005) and post of IFRS (2006 till 2009).
Nit = β0 + β1DRit + β2Rit + β3RitxDRit + β4D_IFRS + β5D_IFRSxDRit 
+ β6D_IFRSxRit + β7D_IFRSitxRitxDRit + ε
(3)
Pt = α + β1NIit + β2BVit + β3D_IFRSit + β4NIit*D_IFRSit  
+ β5BVit*D_IFRSit + ε
(4)
where all variables as described above, D_IFRSit is dummy variable which takes 
the value of 1 for the period after IFRS and 0 otherwise.
In model (3), dummy variables DRit capture the intercept and slope 
effects for the negative return sample. Our focus variable is the coefficient β7 
which measures the relationship between the level of asymmetric timeliness 
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of conservatism and IFRS. It is expected that the coefficient to be positive and 
significant, showing that earnings conservatism is increased after the adoption of 
IFRS.
Coefficient β2 measures the responsiveness of earnings to good news before 
the IFRS adoption, while the sum of β2 + β6 is measuring the responsiveness of 
earnings to good news after the IFRS adoption. A positive significant coefficient β6 
implies incremental responsiveness of earnings to good news after IFRS adoption. 
We offer no prediction for the intercept and incremental intercept coefficients 
β0, β1 DRit, β4 D_IFRS and β5 D_IFRSxDRit in measuring earnings conservatism.
In model (4), the relationship between balance sheet conservatism is 
determined by the coefficient β5 which is the coefficient of the interaction between 
book value and the dummy year of IFRS. It is expected that the coefficient will 
be significantly negative, leading to the positive effect of IFRS as it leads to a 
decrease in the understatement of assets relative to market's valuation. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables within the periods. For 
earnings conservatism presented in Panel A of Table 3, the mean (median) value 
for the dependent variable, which is earnings, and independent variable which is 
return are 4.427 (0.000) and 1.174 (0.990) respectively. The mean value shows 
that throughout the period earnings are higher than return which indicates that 
overall the sample do not shows earnings conservatism. Nevertheless, in term of 
median, earnings are lower than return which indicates the existence of earnings 
conservatism. Standard deviation for earnings are also far larger than the standard 
deviation of return which indicates that throughout the period earnings is not 
really a function of return. For balance sheet conservatism tabulated in Panel B of 
Table 3, the mean (median) for book value of shares (BV) is 0.808 (1.000), which 
is slightly lower than share price (P), which shows a mean of 1.742 (0.910). The 
result for mean indicates that balance sheet exist among the firms in the sample as 
the book value is lower than the share price. Nevertheless, the result for median 
indicates that book value is slightly higher than the share price which indicates that 
firms are not conservative. 
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Earnings Conservatism
Mean Median Maximum Minimum SD
N 4.427 0.000 152.516 -73.638 11.895
R 1.174 0.990 14.444 0.137 1.129
R (log) -0.064 -0.010 2.670 -1.987 0.639
DR 0.506 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.500
Panel B: Balance Sheet Conservatism
Mean Median Maximum Minimum SD
P 1.742 0.910 51.250 0.025 3.015
NI 0.182 0.111 15.406 -3.646 0.468
BV 0.808 1.000 1.000 0.080 0.291
BV (log) -0.332 0.000 0.000 -2.526 0.585
Note: SD = Standard Deviation
Univariate
We run univariate analysis to test the effect of IFRS on both types of conservatism. 
Table 4 presents differences in the mean and median values of our measures of 
measures of conservatism for the periods before and after IFRS. The table shows a 
significant improvement in some of conservatism variables. The average of return 
R has significantly increased from 0.981 to 1.239 after IFRS. Nevertheless, the 
value of earnings is not significantly difference from pre to post IFRS. The result 
indicates that even though return is significantly increasing, the value of earnings 
has no significant difference. This result indicates early evidence that IFRS has 
some effect on earnings conservatism. The average of share price P decreased from 
1.895 to 1.691 whereas the average of net income NI shows a slight decrease from 
0.205 to 0.175 after IFRS. The average of book value of shareholder's equity per 
share also decreases after IFRS from 0.879 to 0.784. The average of share price 
P decreased from 1.895 to 1.691 and it is only significant using Mann-Whitney 
test. The average book value of shareholder's equity per share (BV) show slight 
decreases after IFRS which is from 0.879 to 0.784 respectively. As presented in 
the table, the mean values for the share price are greater than the values for book 
value of shareholders' equity per share. This provides evidence of the existence 
of balance sheet conservatism in this country throughout the sample period. The 
decrease in value is even more after IFRS, providing more evidence that balance 
sheet conservatism is decreasing after IFRS.
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Multivariate7
In order to test more strongly on the role of IFRS on conservatism, we run 
multivariate analysis. Table 5 reports the regression results for earnings 
conservatism. The intercept is significantly positive throughout the models as 
predicted by Basu (1997). We present model 1 till 6 to show one by one the effect of 
earnings conservatism measured by the interaction of DR*R.  We start with the basic 
model of Basu's (1997). The interaction of DR*R which is earnings conservatism 
is significantly negative at 1%. The result remains negative throughout the model 
1 till model 6 which indicates that overall the firms in the sample are not earnings 
conservative. Nevertheless, after we interact earnings conservatism with IFRS 
(D_IFRS*DR*R), the results show that earnings conservatism increases after IFRS 
and it is significant at 1% level. The result for R is significantly positive indicating 
that earning is more responsive to good news before IFRS adoption. Nevertheless, 
the positive interaction between D_IFRS*R is significantly negative providing 
evidence that earnings are less responsiveness to good news after IFRS adoption.
The results indicate that the adoption of IFRS from common-law countries 
such as UK brings positive effect to the financial reporting quality in Malaysia. The 
result is consistent with Garcia-Lara et al. (2008) who found that the effects of IFRS 
Table 4
Univariate analysis of differences of earnings and balance sheet conservatism in the pre- 
and post IFRS
Panel A: Earnings Conservatism
Pre IFRS (n = 943) Post IFRS (n = 2331) p-value
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD t-test Mann-Whitney
N 4.379 0.000 11.861 4.444 0.000 11.910 0.815 0.690
R 0.981 0.754 1.261 1.239 1.033 1.073 0.000 0.000
R (log) -0.307 -0.282 0.679 0.018 0.033 0.603 0.000 0.000
DR 0.733 1.000 0.443 0.430 0.000 0.495 (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B: Balance Sheet Conservatism
Pre IFRS (n = 1976) Post IFRS (n = 2042)
P 1.895 1.000 3.486 1.691 0.890 2.838 0.105 0.003
NI 0.205 0.119 0.676 0.175 0.108 0.373 0.107 0.074
BV 0.879 1.000 0.241 0.784 1.000 0.302 0.000 0.000
BV (log) -0.201 0.000 0.463 -0.376 0.000 0.614 0.000 0.000
Note: Significant p-values are in bolds. The figures in parentheses () denote Chi-square statistics.
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on earnings conservatism is more pronounced in common-law countries compared 
to code law countries. The results also support previous research (Barth et al., 
2008; Daske et al., 2008) which argue that IFRS reporting increases transparency, 
reduces the amount of reporting discretion and improves comparisons across firms. 
Table 5
Earnings conservatism and IFRS
Regressions 1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept 2.884 3.215 3.655 5.346 4.181 2.887
1.988** 2.220** 2.450** 3.355*** 2.581*** 1.727*
DR -0.319 -0.835 -0.484 -2.870 -0.450 0.010
-0.540 -1.356 -0.814 -2.889*** -0.372 0.009
R 5.491 5.355 5.449 5.353 7.985 10.770
7.763*** 7.529*** 7.699*** 7.561*** 7.859*** 7.990***
DR*R -4.107 -3.425 -3.950 -3.965 -4.589 -8.792
-4.188*** -3.380*** -4.018*** -4.037*** -4.637*** -5.292***
D_IFRS -0.909 -2.841 -1.322 0.286
-1.939* -3.478*** -1.423 0.266
D_IFRS*DR 2.907 -0.455 -0.745
2.962*** -0.326 -0.534
D_IFRS*R -3.357 -6.918
-3.484*** -4.417***
D_IFRS*DR*R 5.955
2.938***
Period dummies No Yes No No No No
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.045 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.050
F-statistic 12.111 9.499 11.506 11.297 11.292 11.128
Observations 3274 3274 3274 3274 3274 3274
Cross-sections 772 772 772 772 772 772
Note: N = net income before extraordinary items per share of firm i, deflated by beginning of period share price; 
R = fiscal year continuously compounded return; DR = dummy variable, equalling one if R is negative, and  '0' 
otherwise; D_IFRS = dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for period after IFRS and '0' otherwise. 
*, ** and ***denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Joos (2008) explains that IFRS differs from a country's individual 
accounting principles in terms of measurement and disclosure of accounting 
standards. IFRS emphasises on the fair value principle which involves a process 
of asset or liability recognition, initial measurement at fair value, re-measurement 
(again, largely, at fair value) and de-recognition. Based on this principle, losses 
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will be valued at market value and hence increase conservatism among managers. 
In terms of disclosure, IFRS emphasizes on detailed footnote disclosures. It sheds 
light on off-balance sheet information such as pension assets and liabilities and 
relevant business information such as segment information, litigation, share-based 
compensation, related-party transactions. 
Table 6 reports the result of for the relationship between balance sheet 
conservatism and IFRS. The intercept is significantly positive throughout the 
models. Consistent with earnings conservatism model in Table 5, we present model 
1 till 6 to show one by one the effect of balance sheet conservatism measured 
by the book value coefficient.  Model 1 in Table 6 indicates the basic model of 
balance sheet conservatism. The book value coefficient is significantly positive 
throughout the model indicating the existence of balance sheet conservatism 
among the firms in the sample. The result indicates that understatements of assets 
Table 6
Balance sheet conservatism and IFRS
Regressions 1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 0.983 0.991 0.997 1.022 1.045
5.754*** 5.788*** 5.788*** 5.907*** 6.031***
NI 2.143 2.132 2.142 1.959 1.960
26.198*** 26.011*** 26.196*** 15.479*** 15.504***
BV 0.236 0.218 0.233 0.233 0.405
2.827*** 2.580*** 2.774*** 2.779*** 3.244***
D_IFRS -0.021 -0.056 -0.091
-0.649 -1.531 -2.262**
NI*D_IFRS 0.264 0.262
2.000** 1.988**
BV*D_IFRS -0.236
-1.977**
Period fixed No Yes No No No
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.259 0.275 0.259 0.259 0.260
F-statistic 118.027 90.767 108.960 101.533 95.077
Observations 4018 4018 4018 4018 4018
Cross sections 754 754 754 754 754
Note: P = share price at the balance sheet date; NI = earnings after extraordinary items per share; BV = period-end 
book value of shareholders' equity per share; D_IFRS = dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for period 
after IFRS and '0' otherwise.
*, ** and ***denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
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relative to market's valuation is still practised in Malaysia throughout the period. 
Nevertheless, the coefficient of net income is also consistently positive throughout 
the model indicating that earnings remain persist. The result indicates that both 
types of conservatism exist among the firms in the sample. Nevertheless when we 
interact the book value coefficient with IFRS (BV*D_IFRS), the result indicates 
that balance sheet conservatism decrease after IFRS and it is significant at 5% 
level. Supporting H2, the results indicate that the consistent understatement of 
assets characterised by the balance sheet approach is overcame in the IFRS as the 
new standards temporarily lower down the value of assets and will be reversed 
later due to changes in accounting estimates (Hellman, 2008). The negative 
relationship between balance conservatism and IFRS has been a sign that Malaysia 
has successfully adopted IFRS from common-law countries model even though 
their institutional structures can still be characterized as a variant of the code law 
model (Ball et al., 2003).  Malaysia is one of the East Asian countries that has 
strong common-law influence especially in terms of its accounting standards as 
this country has adopted accounting standards from early British colonial influence 
to the more recent influence of IFRS. 
Clarkson, Hanna, Richardson and Thompson (2011) state that the valuation 
role of earnings is more pronounced in shareholder oriented financial reporting 
compared to stakeholder-based. Ball et al. (2000) and Soderstrom and Sun (2007) 
emphasise that legal systems either code or common law countries, play an 
important role in influencing accounting standards. This is because, in common 
law countries, accounting standards are set by private sector bodies and, therefore, 
the purpose of standard setting is to satisfy the informational needs of investors. 
Meanwhile, in code law countries, standards are influenced by governments and 
other important stakeholders. Therefore, the role of accounting is to divide the 
interest between those parties. Bae, Tan and Welker (2008) report that there is 
greater divergence between a country's individual accounting principle and IFRS 
in code and common law legal system.
Sensitivity Analysis
Earnings conservatism
Because many other studies have criticised Basu's (1997) measure as having 
econometric biases (e.g., Dietrich, Muller, & Riedl, 2007; Patatoukas & Thomas, 
2011), we measure conditional conservatism beyond Khan and Watts' (2009) 
modified conservatism measure based on Basu's (1997) work to ensure the 
robustness of our findings. The measure we use is based on the Ball and Shivakumar 
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(2005) accruals-based loss recognition model. We modify this measure using the 
methodology that Khan and Watts (2009) adopted to estimate a firm-year measure 
of conservatism:
ACCit = β0 + β1it DCit + β2itCFOit + β3itDCit*CFOit + εit  (5)
where ACCit is the total accruals in year t, deflated by the year t–1 market value of 
equity; CFOit is the cash flow from operations in year t, deflated by the year t–1 
market value of equity and DCit is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if CFOit 
is negative and is 0 otherwise. The coefficient of the interaction term between 
DC and CFO (β3) measures the conditional conservatism. If economic losses are 
recognised in a more timely manner than gains, then β3 will be greater than 0.
Table 7
Earnings conservatism and IFRS (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005)
Regressions Coefficient (basic model) Coefficient (IFRS-integrated model)
Intercept 0.000 0.003
(0.032) (0.192)
CFO -0.363*** -0.326***
(-11.374) (-6.730)
DCFO 0.012 0.007
(2.267) (0.909)
CFO*DCFO -0.516*** -0.763***
(-6.402) (-6.360)
D_IFRS -0.004
(-0.772)
D_IFRS*CFO -0.058
(-1.020)
D_IFRS*DCFO 0.009
(0.821)
D_IFRS*CFO*DCFO 0.404***
(2.647)
Period fixed dummies Yes No
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.196 0.196
F-statistic 54.208*** 53.968***
Note: ACCit = total accruals in year t, deflated by the year t–1 market value of equity; CFOit = cash flow from 
operations in year t, deflated by the year t–1 market value of equity; DCit = dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
CFOit is negative and is 0 otherwise. 
*, ** and ***denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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The result using Khan and Watts (2009) adopted measure of earnings 
conservatism in Table 7 is consistent with Basu's (1997) model. The interaction 
DC and CFO is significantly negative which indicates that firms in the sample are 
not conditionally conservative. Nevertheless, when we interact the conservatism 
with IFRS, the result is significantly positive indicating that IFRS enhance earnings 
conservatism.
Table 8
Balance sheet conservatism and IFRS (Using MTB)
Regressions Coefficient (basic model) Coefficient (IFRS-integrated model)
Intercept 0.995*** 1.070***
2.898 3.038
NI 2.292*** 2.281***
21.936 12.933
MTB 0.133*** 0.144***
31.060 20.365
D_IFRS -0.092
-1.020
NI*D_IFRS 0.020
0.102
MTB*D_IFRS -0.020***
-2.596
Period fixed dummies Yes No
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.495 0.494
F-statistic 263.660*** 298.153***
Note: P = share price at the balance sheet date; NI = earnings after extraordinary items per share; MTB = market-
to-book ratio; D_IFRS = dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for period after IFRS and '0' otherwise.
*, ** and ***denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Previously, Givoly and Hayn (2000) used market-to-book ratio to examine 
the existence of balance sheet conservatism. Nevertheless, this measurement has 
been criticised as market-to-book ratio can be driven by many other factors (growth 
options, the possibility of monopoly rents and/or synergies, inflation, etc.). Despite 
of the criticism, using market-to-book ratio (MTB) as a proxy for the degree of 
balance sheet conservatism is sensible, though it is still subject to argument. 
Therefore we provide the result for balance sheet conservatism using MTB in 
Table 8 as a measure of balance sheet conservatism. Firms are conservative when 
MTB is larger as firms understate the book value in relevant to market value. The 
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result produced in Table 8 is same with the previous one and in fact, it is more 
significantly negative which indicates that balance sheet conservatism decrease 
after IFRS.
CONCLUSION
Balance sheet conservatism has been used extensively in prior research parallel 
to earnings conservatism as one of the proxy for financial reporting quality due to 
its informational and behavioural aspects. Nevertheless this type of conservatism 
is more evident in code law country such as Germany and Japan where the main 
sources of financing are from system of relationship oriented capital, ownership 
structure which is more concentrated, less shareholder activism and taxation policy 
which relies more on the lower value of assets. In contrast, earnings conservatism 
is more apparent in common law countries where investors' protection is very high.
This study finds strong evidence that earnings conservatism is enhanced 
after IFRS, whereas balance sheet conservatism is reduced after the IFRS 
convergence. Therefore we provide strong evidence that regulation is one of the 
main determinants of conservatism supporting the argument by Watts (2003a, 
2003b). The results indicate that Malaysia has successfully adopted IFRS from 
common-law countries models even though their institutional structures are still 
can be characterised as a variant of the code law model resulting in a decrease in 
balance sheet conservatism. The results, therefore, provide a motivation for the 
regulators in this country on the importance of regulation enforcement. It provides 
an empirical evidence that the role of regulators are very important to always 
review our accounting and corporate governance system in order to ensure that we 
can provide a safe and comfortable market to the investors.
NOTES
1. Arthur Levitt is the former Securities Exchange Commissions (SEC) in the US.
2. Cookie jar reserves are an accounting practice in which a company uses generous 
reserves from good years against losses that might be incurred in bad years.
3. CLSA (Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia) is a brokerage and investment groups 
focused on institutional brokerage, investment banking and asset management for 
corporate and institutional clients around the world.
4. In Article 153 in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, Bumiputras is defined as 
"Malay" and "aborigine", "natives" of Sarawak and "natives" of Sabah.
5. Vincent Tan Chee Yioun is also one of the richest men in Malaysia.
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6. Fair value principle is defined as "the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, 
or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm's length 
transaction" (Riahi-Belkoui, 2004). 
7. Consistent with extant literature on conservatism, a number of interaction terms are 
used in this study. These interaction terms could give rise to potential multicollinearity 
issues. In some cases, the variance inflation factors are found to be higher than the 
preferred threshold of 10.
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APPENDIX
Differences of financial reporting standards IAS and IFRS
Financial 
Reporting 
Standards
IAS IFRS
IAS 2 Under IAS, inventories are 
required to be stated at a lower 
cost or market (LCM), with market 
defined as current replacement 
cost. Market should not exceed 
net realizable value (defined as 
the estimated selling price in the 
ordinary course of business less 
reasonably predictable costs of 
completion and disposal) or be less 
than NRV reduced by an allowance 
for a normal profit margin.
Under IFRS, inventories are stated at a lower 
cost or net realizable value (defined as the 
estimated selling price in the ordinary course of 
business less the estimated cost of completion 
and the estimated cost necessary to make 
the sale). Under IFRS, there is no concept of 
reducing NRV to allow for a normal profit 
margin.
Unlike IAS, when the circumstances that 
previously caused inventories to be written 
down below cost no longer exist or when 
there is a clear evidence of an increase in net 
realizable value because of changed economic 
circumstances, the amount of the write-down 
is reversed so that the new carrying amount 
is the lower of the cost or the revised net 
realizable value (i.e. the reversal is limited to 
the amount of the original write-down). This 
occurs, for example, when an item of inventory 
that is carried at net realizable value because 
its selling price had declined, is still on hand 
in a subsequent period and its selling price 
has increased. Any impairment or reversal is 
recorded as a cost of sales in the period in which 
it occurs.
IAS 17 In the sale and leaseback 
transactions, Under IAS, a gain or 
loss on a sale-leaseback transaction 
is deferred and amortized over the 
lease term with limited exceptions 
regardless of the leaseback 
classification (seller retains less 
than substantial all of the use of the 
leased asset).
In the sale and leaseback transactions, under 
IFRS the timing of recognition of a gain or 
loss on a sale and leaseback transaction differs 
depending on the classification of the leaseback. 
A gain or loss on a finance lease is deferred and 
amortized over the lease term. A gain or loss 
on an operating lease is recorded immediately 
if the sale price is established at fair value. 
Otherwise, it should be deferred and amortized 
over the lease term.
The Effect of Malaysia’s Convergence to IFRS
181
IAS 36 For fixed asset, impairment 
is calculated by comparing 
undiscounted cash flows to the 
carrying amount of the asset group. 
Therefore if undiscounted cash 
flow is lower than the carrying 
amount, then there is impairment 
being charged. 
For fixed asset, impairment is charged 
by comparing the carrying amount with 
recoverable amount. Under IFRS impairment 
is assessed on the basis of recoverable amount, 
which is calculated as either fair value less costs 
to sell or value in use (discounted cash flows). 
If impairment is indicated, assets are written 
down to the higher recoverable amount.
Therefore, impairment charges will likely occur 
sooner than under IAS. For example, assume 
a store's undiscounted cash flow exceeds the 
asset-carrying amount but value in use (i.e., 
based on discounted cash flows) is less than the 
asset-carrying amount. No impairment charge 
would be recorded under IAS but impairment 
would be recorded under IFRS.
IAS 36 An item of property, plant and 
equipment that qualifies for 
recognition, as an asset shall be 
measured at its cost. The cost 
of an item of property, plant 
and equipment is the cash price 
equivalent at the recognition date.
Under IFRS, an entity may elect to value 
property, plant and equipment (PP&E) using 
either the cost or revaluation model. Under the 
revaluation model, an entire class of PP&E is 
revalued at fair value regularly. Revaluation 
increases are credited to equity. Revaluation 
losses are charged first against any revaluation 
surplus in equity related to the specific asset, 
and any excess charged to income.
Estimates of useful life and residual value and 
the method of depreciation are reviewed at least 
annually. 
